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PLAYERS OR PLAYING CARDS?:
THE PALESTINIANS AND THE GULF CRISIS

Yossi Shain & Reuben Aharoni
Tel Aviv University

I
Of all the national communities who have struggled for
national independence since the Second World War the Palestinians led by the Palestine Liberation Organization - PLO, attained
an unprecedented resonance and powerful position in the international scene; more so than any stateless contender and to a greater
degree than many independent states. The significant role played
by the Palestinians in contemporary world politics was acutely
emphasized during the crisis in the Persian Gulf, when they
emerged as a central player capable of weakening the international coalition established by the American President George
Bush against Saddam Hussein of Iraq.
The question to be posed here is how did an ethnicnational group like the Palestinians, having no country of its own
and whose leadership is based in exile, succeed in attaining such
a key political role in world politics; this despite the fact that the
Palestinians have adopted a stand contrary to the broad international consensus in one of the most serious global crises - the
Persian Gulf. The answer to this question can be found in the
unique position of the Palestinians vis-a-vis the Arab world; their
ability to effect or impede Arab unity and to represent two of the
strongest symbolic forces in mobilizing Arab masses Pan-Ara-
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bism and Islam. This position testifies not to the PLO's organizational strength or its military might but rather expresses the
poverty of Arab regimes' legitimation formula. Indeed, the support of the Palestinian cause by Arab regimes is often more verbal
than actual, though supporting the Palestinians is essential for the
personal justification of these regimes. This commitment to the
Palestinians may hinder the ability of Arab governments to act
independently on the international scene should their interests
collide with what is broadly perceived as the Palestinians interest.
In this short article we will discuss the unique position
upheld by the Palestinians in the Muslim-Arab world as well as in
World affairs as it came to light in the months following the
Persian Gulf crisis. In reviewing Palestinian behavior, the reaction of Arab countries, and the international community it will
become apparent how narrow is the commonly accepted thesis
that the Palestinians are only pawns in advancing the interest of
their Arab patrons. Dialecticaly speaking it can be stated that the
Palestinians have turned from clients to patrons as a result of their
unique position.

II
In the Spring of 1990 it seemed as if the Palestinian
struggle for national independence in the Israeli occupied West
Bank and Gaza was profiting on the international scene, especially in the United States. After a period of two and a half years
of national uprising in the occupied territories,
known as the intifada. the PLO leaders managed to create a wedge
in the close ties between the U.S. and Israel. In May 1990 the
tension between Washington and Jerusalem reached unprecedented heights when the U.S., Israel's most devoted ally, was
preparing to support an Arab League initiative in the U .N. condemning Israel policies in the occupied territories "as a breach of
International Law." 1
The international pressure on Israel to find a solution to the
historical conflict with the Palestinians increased substantially
after December 1988, when the U.S. decided to commence a
"substantive dialogue" with the PLO; a decision which brought to
an end the long standing American objection to such contacts.
While high riding the waves of sympathy which the intifada
evoked through the media, PLO leader Y asser Arafat announced
in a dramatic move that he foreswore terrorism and accepted U .N.
resolutions 242 and 338 that recognize Israel's right as a sovereign
state. On November 1988, at the Nineteenth Palestinian National
Council (PNC) meeting, in Algiers, the Palestinians officially
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declared "Independence and Palestinian Statehood."
Toward the end of 1989 U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker initiated a peace plan, widely known as the "Baker Plan",
calling for an Israeli-Arab confluence aimed at leading to free
elections in the occupied territories to determine the Palestinian
representatives for future talks with Israel. 2 The internal debate in
Israel regarding the adoption or rejection of the Baker Plan and the
U.S. pressure on the Israeli government to move towards a
meeting with the Palestinians eventually led in March 15, 1990 to
the downfall of the Unity Coalition Government ofYitzak Shamir's
Likud and Shimon Peres's Labor, and to one of the worst political
crises experienced in Israel. 3
In May 1990 the projected image of the Palestinian struggle
reached unprecedented heights. The dramatic changes taking
place in Eastern Europe, the advancing towards unity in the West
and the dissolving of regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Cambodia
and South West Africa, pointed to the urgency in solving the
Palestinian issue in obtaining world peace. The reluctace of
Yitzak Shamir's right wing government to accept the Baker Plan
damaged Israel's international position and it seemed as if the
Palestinians were closer than ever before to the attainment of a
substantial political achievement.
However, in August 1990, just a few months after this
Palestinian climax the PLO found itself in one of it lowest ebbs.
The dramatic regression in the effectiveness of the organization
was a direct result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August
1990 that shifted the international attention away from the Palestinian issue towards the Persian Gulf. The Palestinian position
was further aggravated because of the support given by Arafat and
the Palestinian masses to Saddam Hussein.
III

The Palestinian support of Iraq emerged sharply in the
face of the international Anti-Iraqi coalition and especially in light
of George Bush's partial success in undermining the mythology
of Arab Unity in the face of foreign "imperialistic" intervention.
On 10 August 1990, the Arab League adopted a seven point
resolution rejecting the annexation of Kuwait, endorsing the U .N.
sanctions against Iraq and calling for Arab troops to defend Saudi
Arabia alongside the Americans. The Palestinians and the Libyans remained the exceptions in their rejection.
The Palestinian support of Saddam expressed their aversion to U.S.-Arab ties indirectly advantageous to Israel. Support
of Arab leaders of a Western embargo on Iraq was regarded by the
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Palestinians as a form of disloyalty to their cause. In an interview
to the New York Times a West Bank resident commented: "What
these other Arab leaders are doing is selling cheap oil to America
so the Americans can improve their economy and use it to support
our enemy Israel. "4 In an editorial in the East Jerusalem newspaper
al-Byadir al-SiYasi the writer said: "The jungle law allows U.S.
to invade Grenada, to send forces to Panama and Liberia and to
permit the invasion of Palestinian and Lebanese lands on the one
hand, yet on the other declares a state of emergency and sends in
forces against Iraq who entered Kuwait in order to recapture land
that belonged to her historically." 5
In addition to the outrage towards theArab-U.S. coalition,
the Palestinian adherence to Saddam expressed feelings of animosity sensed by many members of their community towards the
rulers of Gulf countries whose eminent wealth was overtly pronounced in comparison to the poverty and distress of the Palestinian refugees in the occupied territories. Many Palestinians resented the boundless wealth of the Black Gold countries that have
misused them as cheap manpower while denying them basic
citizenry rights, refraining even from granting the Palestinians
permanent residence status.
Prior to the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait, one of the wealthiest
Gulf countries, housed about 400,000 Palestinians who served its
bureaucratic system in all its aspects. The Palestinians sent large
sums of money to their families in the occupied territories so that
each year about 130 million dollars, diverted through banks in
Amman, was invested in the West Bank in private consumption as
well as in local institutions. In addition, a 5% tax fee was levied
on salaries earned by the Palestinians in Kuwait and other countries in the Gulf. This amounted to about 125 million dollars that
went through the PLO to the Palestine National Fund. 6
In July 1988 after King Hussein of Jordan severed ties
with the West Bank, the Kuwaiti government used this opportunity to put an end to the direct flow of funds to the PLO. The
Kuwaitis also failed to comply with the decision taken by the Arab
Summit held in Algiers in July 1988, that called on all Arab
countries to aid the PLO. This refusal was condemned by Arafat
in May 1989 in Casablanca. From the Palestinian reaction in the
occupied territories it can be assumed that, although they benefitted from the financial aid they had received over a number of
years, the Palestinians harbor deep animosity toward the Gulf
countries, and toward Kuwait in particular. Hi sham Hawartani, an
economist from the WestBankUniversityof Al-Najah, inNablus,
commented in an interview that, "in the last few years the
Kuwaitis have become snobs, brags and slowly but surely severed
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their ties with the Arab World. The influx of financial wealth into
the West Bank and Gaza Strip was only of marginal importance
and this is an impudence that they will not be forgiven for. The
Kuwaitis have wealth beyond measure and they invested large
sums everywhere else in the world except for here". 7
Finally the Palestinians' rallying behind Saddam was an
indication of their latent desire for Arab unity. As a stateless
people, the Palestinians have come to represent a radical approach
to Arab politics that combines anti establishment streams like
Pan-Arabism, Third World and left ideologies and fundamental
Islam, which all pose a direct challenge to the Arab state system.
Hence they sought to exploit Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as a
springboard to undermine the existing order. Furthermore, the
Palestinians who are known for their historical tendency for
divisions and schism in their ranks saw in the figure of Saddam
Hussein a knight in shining armor who would unite the Arab world
around their cause. Saddam's earlier threats against Israel and his
conditioning an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait upon an Israeli
withdrawal from the occupied territories, strengthened the Palestinians' long standing support for the Iraqi leader who has earned
the title of the "Second Saladin."
The conception that Arab unity will lead to the "liberation
of Palestine" has been a central aspect in the ideological struggle
of the Palestinians, though in reality all attempts to realize the
dream of Pan-Arabism have resulted in disappointment. Since the
declaration oflsraeli independence in 1948 (known by the Palestinians as the "1948 disaster") and up to the defeat of Arab
countries in the 1967 Six Day War, Palestinian nationality and
Pan-Arabism were tightly linked. The main source of energy that
inspired the creation of the Palestinian national movement was
found in the charismatic personality of Gamal Abdul-Nasir who
subscribed to the idea of a unitary Arab state, including liberated
Palestine. Egypt, under the leadership of Nasir, became the
leading patron of Palestinian nationalism. Nasirism struck roots in
Palestinian mythology and served as a catalyst for the establishment of the PLO in 1964. The integral attachment to Nasir's PanArabism was manifested in the PLO's early Charter where no
mention is made of the Palestinians' desire for an independent
state or govemment. 8 But the defeat suffered by the Arabs in 1967
gradually led to Palestinian disillusionment with Pan-Arabism.
As Fouad Ajami pointed out, "If the Arab States could not protect
themselves against Israel, let alone do something for the Palestinians then the latter were to construct their own independent
politics.''9
Moreover, the l 970's were marked by a sharp decline in
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the pursuit of Arab unity among the Arab states' leaders, including
the more revolutionary Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq, who
have invested their efforts on widening their power base at home
and consolidating their rule. Saddam Hussein, for example, has
used much of Iraq's oil revenues to bridge the gap between rich
and poor Iraqis and to accommodate Shiite demands. Since 1967,
therefore, the Palestinians gradually set aside their adherence to
Pan-Arabism and adopted an independent national stance. Their
experience under Israeli occupation has helped to recreate them as
a separate nation.
The Palestinian armed struggle intensified during the
1970' s and was marked by numerous terrorist acts inside Israel
and abroad and by continuous attempts to establish a Palestinian
military force along the Israeli borders, first in Jordan and later in
Lebanon. The armed struggle strategy yielded diplomatic results
and in 1974, in Rabat, the Arab States recognized the PLO as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. This recognition was followed by major diplomatic coups for the PLO in many
countries, especially in the Third World, and the PLO was
elevated to a unique position in the United Nations. 10 Anwar elSadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1977 and the Egyptian-Israeli
peace talks culminating in the Camp David Accords in 1979,
further deepened the Palestinian mistrust of a Pan-Arabic salvation. However, throughout all these years Palestinian diplomacy
never gave up on the rhetoric of Arab unity .11

IV
The constant pursuit of the Palestinian problem was, and
continues to be an important part of the legitimation formula of
Arab governments. Both radical and conservative states invested
economic resources and provided diplomatic support to the Palestinian struggle and to the PLO for reasons far beyond their
aversion to Israel or their authentic solidarity with the misfortune
and distressful situation of their Arab brothers. This support of the
Palestinians is intrinsically connected to the internal legitimation
crisis of Arab regimes and it serves as an alibi for their failures to
solve their internal problems. Paradoxically, however, the Arab's
states failure to transform the Palestinian predicament has remained one of the most important delegitimizing factors of their
regimes. 12
The central problem for progressive revolutionary states
is one of identity-the lack of national-ethnic religious unity
within the state and the existence of primordial loyalties that
undermine the governmental legitimacy. Moreover in the absence
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of democratic procedures force and suppression become central
means of enlisting loyalty. As Lisa Anderson has pointed out: "the
extent to which governments of the region rest their rule on naked
power or clothe it in respect for regular procedures varies along a
continuum from those whose fidelity to the rule oflaw is relatively
constant to those whose behavior is widely condemned as essentially criminal." 13
The lack of democratic mechanisms in neutralizing opposition led many Arab states to search for ideological justification
beyond their frontiers. Pan-Arabism, leftist ideologies of the
Third World, as well as Islamic symbols serve as justifications for
the progressive revolutionary states. Pro-Palestinian gestures
became an important aspect of this multifaceted legitimation
formula. The Syrian Baathist leadership in the hands of the Ala wi
minority, for example, continuously proclaim their support of the
Palestinians as one of their government's raison d'etre. In an oral
address President Hafiz al-Assad expressed Syria's enduring
support for the Palestinians:
"How much have we sacrificed for the Resistance
in the past few years? Fifty percent of the Syrian
military aircraft destroyed in the clashes with the
enemy [Israel] before the 1973 war were in the
defence of positions of the Palestinian Resistance.
Thirteen planes were lost in Urqub in defence of the Resistance. These aircrafts were manned by
the elite of our pilots ...We lost 500 soldiers in one
day. We lost them in a fight with the enemy
because the enemy had hit a Fidai (guerilla) base
somewhere in Syria. The battles we fought
against the enemy for the sake of the Palestinian
Resistance are numerous ... Who has done for the
Resistance what Syria has done? Who has sacrificed for the Resistance what Syria has sacrificed?"14
The Syrian rhetoric of fidelity to the Palestinian cause did not,
however, deter Syrian soldiers from siding with the Christian
Militia in Lebanon in 1976against the Palestinians. Likewise, the
Iraqi financial and diplomatic support of the Palestinians has
always been tempered by Iraqi political needs.15
As to the traditional Islamic regimes, their legitimation
problem is rooted in their failure to comply with modem mythology of popular sovereignty. This fact was exploited by revolutionary Arab regimes, in the past headed by Nasir and during the Gulf
crisis by Saddam Hussein, who have challenged their mere
existence. The fact that many of the Arab monarchies represent
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merely family wealth derived from the oil fields with little other
bases of legitimacy stands in sharp contrast to the Palestinians
who have a nation and a people, widely recognized by the
international community, yet remain stateless. This contradiction
between a stateless people and a nationless monarchy has proved
continuously destabilizing. Hence, Arab monarchies have tried to
diffuse revolutionary pressures to transform their systems by
paying homage to Pan-Arabism, primarily to its most common
denominator - the Palestinians - who have come to represent a
binding force in an increasingly vague notion of Arab unity. It is
for this reason Arab monarchies provided strong diplomatic
support and lavish financial aid to the PLO and were reluctant to
support Egypt's conciliatory moves towards Israel in Camp
David.
But beyond their rhetorical adherence to Pan-Arabism,
Arab regimes and leaders must constantly demonstrate their
devotion to Islam. As the historian Bernard Lewis commented:
"Islam provides the most effective system of political mobilization, whether to arouse the people in defence of a regime that is
perceived as possessing the necessary legitimacy or against a
regime which is perceived as lacking that legitimacy, in other
words, not being Islamic or, perhaps, as having forfeited that
legitimacy by no longer being Islamic." 16 Arab leaders therefore,
including those at the head of modern secular states such as Syria
and Iraq, must incorporate Islamic rhetoric and symbols as part of
their ruling mechanism in their campaign to destroy religious
opponents who challenge their claims to power. Saddam Hussein's
court biographers even found it appropriate to mythologize their
leader by tracing his origins back to the prophet Mohammed.
Adherence to Islam as a basis for internal legitimation
intensified with the decline of Nasirism following the 1967 defeat,
and as a result of the erosion in the concept of Arab unity with the
consolidation of Arab revolutionary regimes. Ironically, it was
Saddam Hussein who announced in 1982, that "the question of
linking [Arab] unity to the removal of boundaries is no longer
acceptable to present Arab mentality." 17 He declared Nasir's
vision of an Arab nation as one state as "sheer dreams" and called
for all Arab states' to exercise mutual respect to the demarcation
of boundaries between them. 18
The need to pay homage to Islam increased significantly
after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 which provoked fundamental
currents in the entire Arab-Moslem world. Dependency on Islam
enhances the stature of the Palestinians in the Arab world as they
have come to represent, (and indeed promote their image as) the
sacrificial lamb in the struggle to recapture the Holy City in East
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Jerusalem, which was annexed by Israel after the 1967 War. Since
1967, therefore, the fight for Jerusalem became a major force in
the hands of the Palestinians in rallying Arab and Islamic support.
The Temple Mount in East Jerusalem has been a source of
tension and national religious struggle between Arabs and Jews
for many generations. The Temple Mount, known as al-Haram al
Sharif, is second only to Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia as a
holy shrine for the Muslims. Also found on the Temple Mount are
the only ruins of the Second Temple sanctified by the Jews as their
holiest site. In 1929, a bloody riot broke out between Arabs and
Jews in Palestine following a dispute over Jewish prayer at the
Wailing Wall. The Jews tried to implement freedom of worship
while the Muslims believed them to have ulterior motives aimed
at conquering the Temple Mount and rebuilding the Jewish
Temple. From 1948 to 1967 the Temple Mount and East Jerusalem were under Jordanian occupation. Despite earlier Jordanian
proclamations to allow freedom of worship, the Jews were denied
access to the Wailing Wall. In the aftermath of the Six Day War,
Israel and Jordan, with tacit approval of local Palestinians, informally agreed to the control of the Temple Mount by the Islamic
Endowments (A wkaf) which was part of the Jordanian official
bureaucracy. Since July 1988, when Jordan severed its ties with
the West Bank, more and more Islamic radicals have penetrated
the Awkaf.
The arrangement at the Temple Mount did not prevent the
conversion of the place to a fertile ground for inciting religious
and political riots. In August 1969, a 21 year old Christian,
Michael Rowen, set alight the al-Aksa Mosque. Subsequently it
was discovered that Rowen was psychologically unstable; yet the
reaction of the Arab countries was extreme and in the U.N. they
proposed to send an investigation committee to look into the
matter. At the outbreak of the intifada the Palestinian leadership
declared the day of Rowen's failed attempt a memorial day to be
honored by demonstrations and strikes. On 11 April 1982, Alan
Goodman, a Jewish-American who lived in Jerusalem and served
in the Israeli army, burst into the al-Aksa Mosque opening fire and
killing two Arabs. It was assessed that he too was deranged. For
whatever reason the event was subsequently erased from Palestinian memory as indicated by the failure of the intifada leaders to
sanctify it as a memorial day.
Over the years a number of attempts by Jewish extremists
and various criminal groups to break into and rampage mosques
on the Temple Mount were uncovered. The most militant and
vocal Jewish extremist is a minority group called the "Temple
Mount Faithfuls" who have advocated to "cleanse" the holy site
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of all Muslim mosques in order to rebuild what they called the
"Third Jewish Temple." Defying a religious prohibition declared
by the Chief Rabbinical court forbidding observant Jews from
entering the Temple Mount area, the Temple Mount Faithfuls
have constantly attempted to hold prayers and symbolic demonstrations on the Mount. Their activities have constantly led to
outbursts of violence and the provocation of the Muslim-Arabs
populace. Muslim leaders have declared every such event to be an
Israeli government's plot to takeover the holy mosques.
On the Palestinian side, during the 1980's, and in particularly during the intifada there has been a rapid growth of radical
Moslem groups exploiting the Temple Mount mosques as a stage
for Islamic propaganda, anti-Jewish incitements, and as a safe
haven during clashes with Israeli police. 19 Since the mid 1980's
Islamic activism has been intensified among the Palestinians who
have gradually lost confidence in the PLO's diplomatic strategy.
For Palestinians who are experiencing political, social and economic deprivation under Israeli occupation, Islam fills an ideological and political vacuum; its eschatological promises provide
symbolic gratification and compensate for their daily sacrifices.
The central Islamic movement in the occupied territories is
Hamas, an umbrella organization consisting of members of the
Muslim Brothers Movement in the Gaza Strip and theal-Muiamma
'al-Jslami. In addition to Hamas, which is a mass movement
whose ideology bridges Islam and Palestinian nationalism, the
other significant organization with strong followers is the Islamic
li.hfilJ..
The latter which is more militant in its objectives, sees the
Islamic Republic of Iran as its model and conducts a selective
recruiting policy .20
Prior to the violent incident on the Temple Mount on
8 October 1990, rumors had been spreading amongst the Palestinians that the Temple Mount Faithfuls were planning to lay a
cornerstone for the intended construction of the Third Temple.
The Israeli Supreme Court, aware of the tension, had granted a
restraining order explicitly forbidding the Temple Mount Faithfuls from making their yearly pilgrimage to the holy site. The
Israeli police conveyed this information to Muslim community
leaders. Unsatisfactory precautionary measures taken to reduce
the tension, resulted in the unprecedented bloodshed on the
Temple Mount and caused international outrage towards Israel,
including unanimous condemnation in the U.N. Security Council
and a motion to send a three member investigatory mission to
probe the events in Jerusalem. The Israeli government's stance
was further aggravated when it rejected the decision as an infringement on Israel's sovereignty.
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For many the Palestinian support of Saddam appeared as
a fatal mistake which would eventually take its toll. Many experts
suggested that "the spectacle of Arafat's embrace of Saddam
Hussein will undoubtedly give pause to the PLO's most hardened
enthusiasts in Europe and the United States," 21 and that the only
beneficiary of the Palestinian stand will be Israel, whose refusal
to enter into negotiations with the PLO, will be readily accepted
and sympathized with by the international community. Joel Brinkley wrote in the New York Times that by supporting Saddam "the
momentum that the Palestinians built up through nearly three
years of uprising in the Israel -co11trolled West Bank and Gaza
Strip appears to have been lost." 22 Lilly Weissebrod, a political
sociologist specializing in Middle East ideologies argued that, the
Palestinian "support of Saddam will avail them nothing even in
the unlikely event that he emerges victorious from the conflict
with the U.S." 23 But the chain of events in the occupied territories
during summer of 1990 which culminated in the outburst of
violence in Old Jerusalem on 8 October leaving about eighteen
Arabs dead, refuted the prediction that the Palestinians had been
losing footing on the international scene. Following the fatal
clashes on the Temple Mount the Palestinian issue rebounded to
the forefront of world affairs encompassing enough power to pose
a threat even to the international unity against Iraq.
At present one should not discount the damage in the
international sphere caused by Arafat's embrace of Saddam,
nor should one underestimate the decline of PLO's stature in
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries that have
come to view the organization as a "fifth column." Yet, despite
the present aversion to the PLO, in the long run Arab states can
not abandon the Palestinians or its leadership. The Palestinian
have come to penetrate Arab consciousness and any attempt to
ignore their plight may haunt Arab regimes.
Indeed, the Gulf crisis exposed the political bankruptcy
of Pan-Arabism, as Arab soldiers took opposing sides in the
midst of an international crisis. It proved that Arab states were
striving primarily to enhance their own political objectives
divorced from their Arab connection. Saudi Arabia rushed to
invite American forces to protect its sovereignty despite its
vulnerability to charges of hosting "sacrilegious infidels" at the
holy sites. Egypt's reward for its allegiance to President Bush
was a quick waiver of its national debts of about seven billion
dollars. Hafiz-al-Assad of Syria saw in the Gulf crisis a unique
opportunity to avenge his historic Baathist enemies in Baghdad.
In allying himself with Washington, Assad was also able to put
an end to his growing isolation resulting from the Soviets' new
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disengagement policy from regional conflicts. Finally , the
aligning of Syrian forces alongside the Americans gave Assad
a free hand in eliminating his rivals in Lebanon.
The Palestinians, however, who have no state power at their
disposal, remained isolated in their attempts to manipulate PanArab feelings against U.S. and foreign intervention. They have
sought to use the Iraqi invasion to their advantage by advocating
Arab unity under the banner of "Arab solution to an Arab problem," thereby linking any diplomatic resolution in Kuwait with a
resolution in Palestine. But Arafat's call for Arab unity remained
unheeded in Cairo, Damascus and Riyad.
In the face of the impotence of Pan-Arabism, Islam remains
a powerful resonant alternative through which Palestinians can
appeal to the Arab world. Through their presence in Jerusalem and
the Temple Mount Palestinians have drawn Arab states back into
their fold, forcing them to remain active in their struggle . To the
Arab states' consternation, the Palestinians have demonstrated
that any attempt to attain state goals or to solve inter-state relations
in the region cannot bypass the Palestinian cause. The Temple
Mount incident reemphasized the strong hold Palestinian exert
over Islam and served as a reminder that no Arab leader can
dispense with Palestinians in pursuing domestic or international
objectives.
At the time of writing {November 1990) a resolution to the
Gulf crisis is not yet in sight. However, it is already clear that the
Palestinians have succeeded in injecting themselves into the
international scene as central players in a variety of manners:
1) in the international scene, the recognition of Palestinian rights
for self-determination has long been an integral part of the U.N.
agenda, and there is a growing inclination among Western world
leaders to link a solution in the Gulf with the issue of Palestine whether through a diplomatic initiative or following an Iraqi
defeat in a military operation; 2) in the overall Muslim world
Palestinians are a major force in generating anti-West solidarity;
3) within the Arab states Palestinians are capable of undermining
regimes' attempts to relax strong Islamic opposition and serve as
key players in the Arab states' ability to sustain national cohesiveness - as most acutely demonstrated in Jordan where 60 percent
of the population, who are of Palestinian origin, have sided with
Arafat in supporting Saddam and thus forced King Hussein to
walk a tight rope by adopting a "Palestinian" foreign policy.
Thus, unlike many other ethnic groups, and especially exile
organizations searching for state power, the Palestinian have
emerged as a dynamic force in world affairs and not merely as
playing cards in the hands of others.
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